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Economists are as perplexed as anyone by the
behavior of the stock market. Figure 1 shows a
broad measure of stock-market value in relation
to GDP from 1947 through 2000. In addition to
saw-tooth movements including the contraction
in late 2000, the value of the stock market has
large, low-frequency swings, moving upward
from 1950 to 1965, then downward to 1982, and
upward until early 2000.
I entertain the hypothesis that these large
movements are the result of rational (if not
accurate) appraisal of the cash likely to be re-
ceived by shareholders in the future. The hy-
pothesis receives some support from work by
ﬁnancial economists showing that irrational
markets create proﬁt opportunities for active
traders and that passive traders consistently earn
higher returns. Most of my discussion will be
complementary to the work of ﬁnancial econo-
mists—I will look at the fundamentals underly-
ing stock-market values.
The lecture considers three potential contrib-
utors to the big movements shown in Figure 1:
(i) changes in the value of debt claims;
(ii) changes in the value of the plant and
equipment that corporations own;
(iii) changes in the value of intangibles owned
by corporations and in the value of claims
of stakeholders who are not securities
holders.
I correct Figure 1 by adding data on the market
value of debt and ﬁnd that most of the large
swings remain. I ﬁnd that movements of the
stock of plant and equipment are also of little
help in understanding the big swings. Changes
in the inferred values of intangibles and stake-
holder claims account for the great bulk of the
large movements of stock-market values. I ex-
amine corporate cash ﬂows to seek conﬁrmation
that intangibles are either contributing to value
or diminishing it. My conclusion is tentatively
in favor of the intangibles/stakeholders hypoth-
esis, because cash ﬂows move in a way that is
consistent with securities values but depart tre-
mendously from the likely movements of the
earnings of hard assets alone.
A rational stock market measures the value of
the property owned by corporations. Some
types of corporate property, especially the types
held by high-tech companies, have values that
are exquisitely sensitive to the future growth of
the cash they generate. Both the high value of
these types of property and the volatility of the
value are consistent with the present-value
model.
I reject market irrationality in favor of the
hypothesis that the ﬁnancial claims on ﬁrms
command values approximately equal to the
discounted expected future returns. The stock
market’s movements are generally consistent
with rational behavior by investors. There is no
need to invoke fads, animal spirits, or irrational
exuberance to understand the movements
shown in Figure 1. Instead, the key concepts are
intangibles and their valuation based on the
level and especially the growth of their cash
ﬂows.
I. Rational Markets
It is convenient to think about ﬁnancial mar-
kets in a simple economy where transactions
occur in one period in anticipation of random
events that take place in the second period.
Suppose that there is a ﬁnite number of possible
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1states of the world in the second period. People
consume a single good. Basic security s pays
one unit of the consumption good in state s and
nothing otherwise. The market meets in the ﬁrst
period and determines the price, ps, of each of
the basic securities.
To avoid proﬁtable riskless arbitrage among
securities, the price of a more complicated se-
curity, paying xs in each of various states, is
V 5 ¥ psxs.
Rationality is a concept rooted in the theory
of choice. Consider an investor who assem-
bles a portfolio to maximize expected utility:
max ¥ psu(cs) subject to the wealth con-
straint ¥ pscs 5 W. Here ps is the probability
the investor assigns to state s. The ﬁrst-order
condition describing the optimal portfolio





where ms is marginal utility in state s. The price
depends on two factors: (i) it is proportional to the
probability of the state, and (ii) it is proportional to
marginal utility in that state. Marginal utility is
equal across states for an investor with no risk
aversion (linear utility). With concave utility, mar-
ginal utility distinguishes good times (low m)
from bad times (high m). For example, if the states
differ by the productivity of the technology for
producing the consumption good, then high-
productivity states will have low values of m.
The more valuable securities are those that pay
off in states with higher probability and those
that pay off in states with higher marginal utility
(securities with less risk).
In this setting, one judges rationality by the
relation between the observed prices, ps, and
the corresponding values of (1/l)psms.As e -
curity is overpriced if the probability of the state
and the marginal utility in that state are too low
to explain the observed price.
Most suggestions of irrationality appear to
deal with mistakes in probability rather than
mistakes in marginal utility. For example, the
widespread belief that Yahoo’s market value of
$140 billion in early 2000 was irrationally high
derived from a belief that investors overstated
the probability that the company would make
high proﬁts, not from a belief that investors
mistakenly thought that Yahoo would do par-
ticularly well in bad times.
In strictly stationary settings, the standard
is straightforward for judging whether a per-
son’s subjective probability is correct. For
example, when the payoff derives from the
toss of a fair coin, it is easy to determine the
rationality of the resulting security price. In
the case of judging Yahoo’s high value, the
standard is less clear. There is no solid way to
show that investors have the probability
wrong. Yahoo is something new; there is no
long history of similar companies to form a
probability distribution from data drawn from
a stationary distribution.
As Mordecai Kurz (1994) has stressed, ratio-
nal beliefs about probabilities are only loosely
constrained in a nonstationary world. An indi-
vidual who believes that new principles govern
the economy will not rationally use historical
data to form beliefs about today and the future.
Rather than deriving probabilities from past ex-
perience, the individual will think through what
will happen in the future.
In an economy where securities are frequently
and seriously mis-priced relative to actual proba-
bilities, an intelligent investor can earn a higher
return from buying underpriced securities and
selling them if they become overpriced, in com-
parison to a policy of holding a stable portfo-
lio representative of the entire market. Mark
Rubinstein (2001) observes that the evidence goes
FIGURE 1. VALUE OF EQUITY CLAIMS ON NONFARM,
NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS AS A RATIO TO GDP,
1947–2000
Source: Equity value from Federal Reserve Board Flow
of Funds Accounts, extended to the end of 2000 in
proportion to the S&P 500; GDP from National Income
and Product Accounts.
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Managers of mutual funds (who deploy vast re-
sources and face strong incentives) consistently
demonstrate the superiority of the passive strat-
egy. Actively managed funds generate returns be-
low passive funds by about the amount of the
trading and other costs involved in active manage-
ment. Rubinstein considers this to be the strongest
evidence in favor of rational markets.
A substantial body of opinion holds that
stock prices move too much: they overreact to
news, and they move sharply even when there is
no news. Even if we do not know when a stock
is overpriced, we can say that its price moves
too much. A line of investigation begun by
Robert Shiller formulates the idea as a statistical
test. Paul Krugman (2000) wrote: “[O]ne thing
is for sure: [The stock market] ﬂuctuates more
than it should ... it’s more a series of random
leaps that a random walk.” Though many econ-
omists agree with Shiller and Krugman, it is
important to understand that excess volatility
implies that active trading strategies yield
higher returns, a proposition that gains no sys-
tematic support from the evidence.
If the marginal-utility/Lagrange multiplier
part of the earlier decomposition of a security
price is a known constant, 1/(1 1 r) 5 m/l,
then the multi-period version of the security
valuation analysis implies that the price of a
stock paying cash x to shareholders in future






If there is excess volatility, one can introduce a






Now subtract (1 1 r)pt from pt11 and write
the result in the form




Nt 1 1 2 ~1 1 r!Nt
pt
.
The left-hand side is the excess return—the
difference between the realized return (includ-
ing capital gain) and the discount rate, r. The
right-hand side is an unpredictable random vari-
able, «t, arising from changes in expected future
dividends, plus the quasi-difference of the noise
component, as a ratio to the stock price.
Recall that the evidence suggests that experts
using active trading strategies make lower re-
turns than passive investors. One implication of
this ﬁnding is that the excess return,
zt 5
pt 1 1 2 pt 1 xt
pt
2 r
is not serially correlated. If it were serially
correlated, experts trading on that observation
would make higher returns than do passive in-
vestors. The expectation update, «t, is serially
uncorrelated by construction. The noise term
will be serially uncorrelated only in the special
case where Nt11 2 (1 1 r)Nt 5 ht, a serially
uncorrelated random variable. This special
case, an asset bubble, has received substantial
attention in the literature on market rationality.
A stock price could zoom off toward inﬁnity
with a noise term growing at the discount rate,
and that particular form of pricing error would
not show up as a predictable component of
the excess return. It is essentially impossible
to build a model in which intelligent people
believe that the value of a stock will become
larger and larger in relation to all other quan-
tities in the economy. A fundamental efﬁciency
condition holds that the discount rate exceeds
the rate of growth of output and other quantities.
Peter Garber (2000) takes a close look at the
Dutch tulip mania and other supposed historical
examples of bubbles. He concludes that they are
the urban legends of ﬁnancial markets.
All other forms of noise create predictable ex-
cess returns. In particular, any form of transitory
noise creates opportunities for beating the market.
In general, when the stock price rises, there is a
chance that it rose because of the transitory noise
and will therefore fall in the near future. The
trading rule is to buy right after negative returns
and sell after positive returns. Fund managers
have not beaten the market with this strategy.
Robert Shiller (2000) nicely summarizes the
evidence against rationality of the stock market.
Most of the evidence involves predictability of
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be lower when stock prices are high relative
to earnings. Firms with low market values in
relation to book value tend to have higher
subsequent returns. He also notes that there is
direct evidence of noise in stock prices be-
cause the present discounted value of actual
dividends is less volatile than actual stock
prices. This proposition translates directly
into the observation I made earlier that noise
in stock prices makes returns predictable. The
difﬁculty with this line of attack on rational
markets is its neglect of the m/l part of the
asset pricing equation. The modest predict-
able element of returns is easily consistent
with modest variations in m/l. Modern ﬁnan-
cial economics speaks of the puzzle of time-
varying risk premiums, not a clear ﬁnding of
irrationality. The same point applies in the
discovery of the market-to-book effect: it may
reveal something about risk, the factor cap-
tured by m/l.
Shiller and other believers in irrational mar-
kets draw on two other types of evidence. One
is obvious pricing errors. Shiller cites a high
valuation given to eToys shortly after the com-
pany went public. I will come back to this topic
at the end of the lecture. Examples of pricing
errors noted by others in this camp include the
failure of two equivalent claims on Shell Oil to
trade at the same price and the valuation of
3Com below the value of its holdings of Palm.
These examples demonstrate that arbitrage can
be expensive and that disagreements about the
values of securities can be substantial when
arbitrage does not close the gap. These and
related pricing puzzles such as the discounts on
closed-end mutual funds raise the question of
how much of the value held by a corporation
will eventually ﬂow to shareholders and how
much will be diverted to managers and other
stakeholders.
The second category of evidence supporting
irrationality is movements in stock prices with-
out corresponding news. No new information
about the fundamentals of the economy became
evident on the days in October 1929 and Octo-
ber 1987 when the market fell remarkably. In-
terpretation of these kinds of events takes us
squarely back to the issue of how people esti-
mate probabilities in a nonstationary world.
Much of Shiller’s discussion of his ideas about
how social processes result in price changes
would be embraced by believers in the basic
principle of asset valuation. It shows that one
person values another’s opinion in assessing
probabilities in a nonstationary environment.
My tentative conclusion is that, despite its
substantial movements, the stock market oper-
ates on the principle of recording the properly
discounted value of the future cash shareholders
expect to receive. The rest of the lecture will
make this hypothesis and say something about
where it leads.
II. Debt
Debt is a burden on the stock market. This
proposition is just a restatement of the Modigli-
ani-Miller theorem. A ﬁrm can issue debt, retire
equity, and lower its stock-market value accord-
ingly. (To bring about a decline in its stock
price rather than in the value of its outstanding
shares, the ﬁrm would need to pay the proceeds
out as dividends.) Bulges of debt could be one
explanation for periods of low aggregate value
of stocks. Figure 2 tests this idea by breaking
the total value of ﬁnancial claims into debt and
equity components. The data are from Hall
(2000a) and place the value of debt on an ap-
proximate market-value basis. As in Figure
1, both are stated as ratios to GDP as a conve-
nient normalization.
Figure 2 makes it clear that debt-type claims
on ﬁrms did grow during the time of low equity
values in the 1970’s and 1980’s, but not enough
FIGURE 2. TOTAL FINANCIAL CLAIMS ON NONFARM,
NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, AS A RATIO TO GDP,
1947–1999
Source: Hall (2000a).
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value.
III. Variations in Hard Asset Values
For much of the rest of the lecture, I will use
the accounting setup shown in Table 1. Under
the hypothesis of rational securities markets, the
two net values are equal. We can read the value
of the ﬁrm’s net nonﬁnancial assets from secu-
rities markets. Data for net ﬁnancial claims are
shown in Figure 2.
In the simple world of many general-
equilibrium macroeconomic models, the only
nonﬁnancial asset is physical capital. If there
is only one kind of output and output serves
as numeraire, and there are no adjustment
costs, then the value of securities reveals the
quantity of capital. The result is what one
might call the real stuff theory of the stock
market: the market moves only as much as the
quantity of real stuff owned by corporations.
Returns earned by shareholders are exactly
the marginal product of capital. Of course, it
remains true that the value of the stock market
is the present discounted value of earnings.
Each unit of capital earns the marginal prod-
uct of capital, and the marginal product also
equals the discount rate.
Figure 3 shows that real stuff is not an im-
portant part of the story of postwar movements
of total ﬁnancial claims. The value of hard
assets is a stable fraction of GDP, and its small
movements are negatively correlated with those
of total ﬁnancial claims.
In the presence of adjustment costs in invest-
ment, the value of capital in place will ﬂuctuate
in relation to the price of capital, as discussed in
Andrew Abel (1999). Corporations will earn
transitory rents from scarce installed capital
when the demand for capital rises unexpectedly,
and the value of that capital will reﬂect the
rents. Hall (2000b) shows that these valuation
effects for hard assets are probably a small part
of the story.
IV. Intangibles
Figure 4 shows the net value of intangibles
during 1947–2000, calculated as a residual
by subtracting the value of hard assets from
total ﬁnancial claims. Huge low-frequency
movements of the residual occurred over
the period. During two episodes (the 1950’s
and 1974–1987) securities values were be-
low—sometimes way below—the reproduc-
tion cost of capital. The likely contribution
of adjustment costs was in the wrong direc-
tion for most of these years, as investment
was strong. During these years, according to
securities markets, the value appropriated
by other stakeholders considerably exceeded
the value of intangibles. The single hardest
episode to understand during those years is
the plunge of residual value from almost 30
percent of GDP in 1972 to 230 percent in
1974.
TABLE 1—THE ACCOUNTING SETUP
Financial claims Nonﬁnancial assets
Value of equity outstanding Value of plant and
equipment
Value of debt outstanding Value of inventories







franchise, and the like
Less value of equity, debt,
receivables, and other
ﬁnancial claims on others





5Net value of non-
ﬁnancial assets
FIGURE 3. HARD ASSETS (PLANT,E QUIPMENT, AND
INVENTORY) AND TOTAL FINANCIAL CLAIMS ON NONFARM,
NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
Note: Plant and equipment are valued at estimated
replacement cost.
Source: Hall (2000a).
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more sharply than over time. Figure 5 shows
residual value in 1998 for two-digit industries in
1998 with more than $10 billion in securities
value. The industry assignments are only ap-
proximate, because many companies operate in
more than one industry. The industries with the
highest values of the residual (those with high
intangible values and low offsets for other
stakeholders) are the technology-users: insur-
ance, banks, and business services. Industries
with low levels of intangibles and heavy bur-
dens from other stakeholders, such as utilities,
oil and gas extraction, primary metals, and air
travel, have zero or negative residuals. The ﬁg-
ure shows wide variation in the residual.
Both the time-series and cross-section evidence
demonstrate large amounts of positive and nega-
tive intangible value in corporations. In recent
times and in technology-using industries, corpora-
tions have accumulated enormous stocks of intan-
gible wealth, according to securities values. In the
later 1970’s and early 1980’s, net corporate stocks
of intangibles were negative; in a few industries as
of 1998, intangibles remained negative.
Both the timing and the industry distribution of
positive intangibles suggest a strong association
with computers and software. Corporations appear
to have built stocks of business know-how, orga-
nizational principles, and electronic business mod-
els—types of property I have called “e-capital”
(Hall, 2000b). Only technical improvements that
remain proprietary become part of a corporation’s
stock of valuable intangibles. Despite the impor-
tance of the computer in the formation of modern
intangibles, computer-makers own relatively
small stocks of intangibles. The availability of
computers is a social good, owned by no com-
pany, and thus captured ultimately by workers as
higher real wages. Companies like Wal-Mart
(whose intangibles account for 80 percent of its
total value) harness computers to create propri-
etary business methods.
Negative intangibles are more of a mystery.
Shareholders stand at the end of a long line of
other claimants on corporate revenue: suppliers,
workers, managers, and governments. Though it
is common to view the return to capital as about
one-third of GDP, cash ﬂow actually available
to shareholders after taxes is generally around 6
percent of GDP (see Fig. 6). At times of de-
clines in intangibles into deep negative levels,
notably 1972–1974, other stakeholders seem to
have tightened their grips on corporations.
Intangibles gain their value from the cash
they generate. The huge rise in measured intan-
gibles in the 1990’s only makes sense if these
stocks actually earned cash ﬂow for sharehold-
ers. Similarly, the idea that intangible value
became negative in the mid-1970’s because of
losses to other stakeholders only holds up if
shareholders did suffer a loss of cash ﬂow. The
evidence I will discuss shortly suggests strongly
that large swings in measured intangibles do
correspond to movements in cash ﬂow. Both the
level and rate of growth of cash ﬂow are critical
to the story.
V. Cash Flow and Securities Values
Corporate securities reveal the value of the
property corporations own. The property, in
turn, derives value from its ability to earn cash
in the future. Do variations in corporate cash
ﬂow help explain the puzzles of the earlier
ﬁgures? Are the intangibles accumulated during
the 1990’s paying their way with growing cash
earned by corporations? Figure 6 shows a mea-
sure of corporate cash ﬂow in relation to GDP.
The numerator is corporate after-tax proﬁt plus
interest payments, from the National Income
and Product Accounts. This measure accepts the
NIPA’s calculation of depreciation as the ﬂow
equivalent of investment spending on hard as-
FIGURE 4. NET VALUE OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS
OF NONFARM,N ONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS,
AS A RATIO TO GDP
Note: Calculated as the difference between the net value
of ﬁnancial claims and the value of hard assets, as a ratio
to GDP.
Source: Hall (2000a).
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basis.
Corporate cash ﬂow ﬂuctuates around a level
of about 6 percent of GDP. Rising cash ﬂow in
relation to GDP in the 1990’s coincided with
large increases in securities values relative to
GDP. On the other hand, even higher cash ﬂow
in the late 1970’s occurred at the same time as
extraordinarily low levels of securities values
relative to GDP.
The value of corporate assets depends on
future as well as current cash ﬂow. In particular,
the capitalization factor (the ratio of value to
current cash ﬂow) is 1/(r 2 g) for discount rate
r and constant future growth rate g. Figure
7 shows the actual capitalization factor together
with movements in the growth rate of real cor-
porate cash ﬂow. The upper line is the ratio of
the value of total ﬁnancial claims on corpora-
tions divided by the cash ﬂow variable of Figure
FIGURE 5. RESIDUAL VALUE AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE VALUE OF HARD ASSETS FOR SELECTED TWO-DIGIT INDUSTRIES, 1998
Source: Compustat, compiled by Jason Cummins.
7 VOL. 91 NO. 2 RICHARD T. ELY LECTURE6. The lower line is, in year t, the annual growth
rate from year t to year t 1 5 of cash ﬂow
divided by the GDP deﬂator. In the last four
years, the growth rate is from year t to 1998, the
last year for which the cash-ﬂow measure is
available.
Figure 7 suggests that growth of cash ﬂow
has the expected relation to the capitalization
factor. The puzzling drop in the capitalization
factor in the mid-1970’s coincided with a sub-
stantial swing in cash-ﬂow growth, from more
than 5 percent at its peak in 1973 to a trough of
25 percent in 1982. The recent rise in the
capitalization factor corresponds to an increase
in real cash-ﬂow growth.
Notice that the capitalization factor jumped
to a postwar high in 1999 and fell only a little in
2000. Other valuation ratios, such as the price/
dividend ratio for stocks, showed more pro-
nounced elevation over historical levels in the
late 1990’s. All of these ratios display mean
reversion, especially over periods of a century
or more (see ﬁg. 1.2 in Shiller [2000]). A high
capitalization factor predicts either a decline in
the future stock price or an increase in cash
ﬂow. Shiller seems to lean more toward the ﬁrst
prediction: the high stock market in the late
1990’s resulted from irrational exuberance
likely to dissipate in the following years. How-
ever, Figure 7 suggests that a high capitalization
factor also predicts cash-ﬂow growth, in accord
with the principles of rational valuation.
VI. Discount Rate
The last inﬂuence that might help explain the
puzzling movements of securities values is the
discount rate. Information about the discount
rate is available from the bond market. The
Treasury bond market places current prices on
future streams of income that are essentially
risk-free in nominal terms. If the future price
level were certain, a Treasury bond would
have the same payoff in every state at a given
future date. Its price would reveal the expected
value of ms/l for that date. Corporate returns,
on the other hand, are risky, in the sense that
payoffs differ across the states of the world.
Because corporate returns tend to be higher in
states with lower values of ms/l, the price of a
claim on a corporation is lower than the price of
a Treasury bond whose certain return is the
same as the expected return to the corporate
claim. In other words, the discount rate to be ap-
plied to corporate returns is higher than the
discount rate for the corresponding Treasury
bond. Still, movements of the observed levels of
discounts for Treasury bonds may provide some
information about the movements of discounts
for claims on corporations.
Figure 8 shows the capitalization factor and
the interest rate on 10-year Treasury bonds
(available from 1954 onward). The period of
high interest rates (the late 1970’s through the
late 1980’s) coincides roughly with the period
of low capitalization factors. At the same time
that the bond market put a low value on future
interest payments, securities markets put a low
value on future cash ﬂow.
The interpretation of the bond interest rate is
complicated by the fact that bonds, until recently,
invariably had payouts deﬁned in dollars rather
than in purchasing power. Figure 8 would be more
informative if it showed the real interest rate, but
that would require solving the hard problem of
FIGURE 6. CORPORATE CASH FLOW AS A RATIO TO GDP
Source: National Income and Product Accounts.
FIGURE 7. CAPITALIZATION FACTOR FOR CASH FLOW AND
FIVE-YEAR FORWARD GROWTH RATE OF REAL CASH FLOW
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ever, there is an approach that sidesteps the issue,
by comparing the nominal interest rate to the
nominal growth of future cash ﬂow. The differ-
ence between the nominal interest rate and the
nominal growth of cash ﬂow is the same as
the difference between the real interest rate and
the real growth of cash ﬂow, so inﬂation adjust-
ment becomes irrelevant.
Suppose that, as of time t, cash ﬂow is ex-
pected to grow at constant rate gt from its
current level xt. The present discounted value of




rt 1 f 2 gt
.
Here rt is the Treasury bond interest rate, and
f is a risk premium, assumed to be constant.
Given observed values of securities prices,
cash ﬂow, and the interest rate, I can solve for
the cash-ﬂow growth implicit in securities
prices:




Figure 9 shows the growth forecast along with
the actual ﬁve-year forward growth rate from
Figure 7. I estimate the risk premium as 8.2
percent, the value that equates expected cash-
ﬂow growth to actual growth over the whole
period. This value is completely in line with
other estimates of the premium on corporate
assets over government bonds.
Notice that the actual growth rate of cash ﬂow
has higher volatility than the forecast implicit in
securities values. Shiller (1981) pointed out that
forecasts should always have this property, which
he believed the stock market violated.
Figure 9 tells some important stories about the
major movements of the stock market since 1954.
The rise in the market through 1960 occurred
because of rising expectations of growth in cash
ﬂow, which were more than validated by subse-
quent experience. The decline in expected growth
in the mid-1960’s was again more than validated
by actual experience. Expected cash-ﬂow growth
reached its peak in 1970, a year that was also the
peak for securities values relative to GDP. Then
expected growth plunged from nearly 10 percent
at its peak to about 4 percent per year during the
years from 1974 to 1981. Actual cash-ﬂow
growth remained above expected until 1978 and
then fell below, reaching a negative value in
1981. Expected growth shot upward to a peak of
over 12 percent in 1982, a movement again
validated by actual growth. The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 was an important factor in the
growth of actual cash ﬂow.
In contrast to the excitement of earlier decades,
the 1990’s were a period of calm from the per-
spective of Figure 9. Expected cash-ﬂow growth
remained in a tight band from 1987 through 2000.
Actual growth, though more volatile than ex-
pected growth, validated the relatively high level
of expected growth. The corresponding story
about the extraordinary heights that the stock mar-
ket reached by 2000 is simple: High expected
cash-ﬂow growth coupled with low discount rates
calls for extreme levels of the capitalization factor.
Moreover, as cash-ﬂow growth actually occurs,
FIGURE 8. CAPITALIZATION FACTOR (LEFT-HAND SCALE)
AND INTEREST RATE (RIGHT-HAND SCALE)
FIGURE 9. GROWTH RATE OF CASH FLOW IMPLICIT
IN SECURITIES VALUES AND ACTUAL FIVE-YEAR
FORWARD GROWTH RATE OF CASH FLOW
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level of the ﬂow, resulting in astronomical levels
of the stock market.
VII. Valuation of Rapid Growth
The discussion to this point has character-
ized cash-ﬂow growth as a constant. For
companies with extraordinary valuations
(eBay, for example), there is no possibility that
historical growth can continue into the indeﬁ-
nite future. If it did, the company would account
for more than all of GDP in a little over a
decade. The earnings of eBay are expected to
rise by 71 percent in 2001 over 2000 in log
terms (Lauren Cooks Levitan, 2000). The valu-
ation of a fast-growing company requires con-
sideration of the future decline in its growth
rate.
Consider a company that generates cash for
its shareholders according to
x~t! 5 x0e
gt2~d/2!t2.
The rate of growth of the cash stream is g 2 dt.
At time zero, growth is at initial rate g. The
growth rate declines over time, reaching zero at
a time T 5 g/d. Figure 10 shows an example of
a stream, calibrated roughly to eBay. The
present discounted value of the stream is
V 5 x0E e
2~r 2 g!t 2~d/2!t2 dt.
Special cases are (i) constant stream, V 5 x0/r,
and (ii) constant growth rate, V 5 x0/(r 2 g).








where F is the cumulative standard normal dis-
tribution and f is its density.
With a positive, constant growth rate, value
becomes indeﬁnitely large as the growth rate g
approaches the discount rate r. The growth rate
cannot exceed the discount rate. On the other
hand, as long as the rate of decline of growth, d,
is positive, the present value will be ﬁnite no
matter what is the initial rate of growth, g. The
value of V for x0 5 1 is the capitalization
factor, shown in Figure 11 for the same 71-
percent growth rate for eBay.
At the beginning of 2000, eBay’s market
value was $19 billion, about 350 times its pro-
spective earnings of $53 million. Figure
11 shows that a capitalization factor that large
makes sense for a company with 71-percent
earnings growth if the growth rate will gradu-
ally decline to zero over the next 17 years. To
sustain the claim that eBay, along with other
dot.coms in early 2000, was obviously overval-
ued, one would need to show that it was im-
plausible that earnings growth would remain
high for more than a decade.
In any case, eBay’s market value at the be-
ginning of 2001 was just over $8 billion, and its
earnings in 2001 were expected to be $108
million, for a capitalization factor of 75. From
Figure 11, this value corresponds to a little less
FIGURE 10. GROWTH PATH OF CASH FLOW, WITH g 5 71
PERCENT PER YEAR AND T 5 14 YEARS
FIGURE 11. CAPITALIZATION FACTOR AS A FUNCTION OF T,
THE NUMBER OF YEARS OF REMAINING GROWTH, WITH
p 5 18 PERCENT AND g 5 71 PERCENT PER YEAR
10 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2001than 11 years of future earnings growth. The
decline in eBay’s market value corresponds to a
shortening of about ﬁve years in the duration of
eBay’s earnings growth (17 years less 11 years
less the year that elapsed). Changes in relatively
distant events have huge effects on current val-
ues, for a company with high earnings growth.
Eduardo Schwartz and Mark Moon (2000)
carry out a related analysis of Amazon. They
model Amazon’s earnings growth as a stochastic
process that begins at a high rate and gradually
approaches a normal rate, with an adjustment
speed of 7 percent per quarter. Their model repli-
cates the volatility as well as the high level of
Amazon’s valuation.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
Though the evidence is hardly conclusive, the
idea that the stock market values the property
owned by corporations seems to stand up reason-
ably well in data for the United States for the past
50 years. The volatility of the aggregate stock
market in relation to other broad measures such as
GDP is substantial, but not out of line with the
movements of cash ﬂows accruing to corporations
after paying all their costs and satisfying all non-
shareholder claimants including governments.
Even some of the most puzzling episodes in the
stock market, such as the collapse of values
by 50 percent in 1973 and 1974, seem within
the grasp of rational understanding, given the
sudden reversal in cash-ﬂow growth that fol-
lowed soon after. The enormous appreciation
of market values in the 1990’s is hardly a
challenge, in view of the consistently high
rates of growth of cash ﬂow during the de-
cade. Furthermore, the reversal of that appre-
ciation in 2000 appears to coincide with
diminished cash-ﬂow growth, though it is too
early to be conﬁdent on that point.
Cash-ﬂow growth is the key factor in under-
standing movements in the stock market. It is
illogical to condemn astronomical price/earnings
ratios as plainly irrational without investigating
the prospects for growth in future earnings.
Streams of future cash growing at high rates are
hugely valuable. Growth rates of cash earned by
companies exploiting new technologies have been
phenomenal. The stock-market values of these
companies swing wildly. The pricing of new tech-
nology companies tries to avoid the error made in
the case of Microsoft: a dollar invested in Mi-
crosoft stock in 1990 resulted in a claim of $1.38
in after-tax earnings in 2000 alone. Obviously the
market in 1990 guessed absurdly low about Mi-
crosoft’s cash-ﬂow growth.
REFERENCES
Abel, Andrew. “The Effects of a Baby Boom on
Stock Prices and Capital Accumulation in the
Presence of Social Security.” Unpublished
manuscript, Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania, October 1999.
Garber, Peter M. Famous ﬁrst bubbles: The fun-
damentals of early manias. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2000.
Hall, Robert E. “The Stock Market and Capital
Accumulation.” National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (Cambridge, MA) Working
Paper No. 7180, May 1999; revised May
2000a, available online: ^www.stanford.edu/
;rehall/&.
. “e-Capital: The Link between the La-
bor Market and the Stock Market in the
1990s.” Brookings Papers on Economic Ac-
tivity, 2000b, (2), pp. 73–118.
Krugman, Paul. “Reckonings; A Leap in the
Dark.” New York Times, 5 January 2000, p.
A-25.
Kurz, Mordecai. “On the Structure and Diversity
of Rational Beliefs.” Economic Theory, Oc-
tober 1994, 4(6), pp. 877–900.
Levitan, Lauren Cooks. “eBay, Inc.” Online re-
port, Robertson Stephens/Internet eConsumer
Research, 17 November 2000.
Rubinstein, Mark. “Rational Markets: Yes or
No? The Afﬁrmative Case.” Financial Ana-
lysts Journal, 2001 (forthcoming).
Schwartz, Eduardo S. and Moon, Mark. “Ratio-
nal Pricing of Internet Companies.” Finan-
cial Analysts Journal, May/June 2000, 56(3),
pp. 62–75.
Shiller, Robert J. “Do Stock Prices Move Too
Much To Be Justiﬁed by Subsequent Move-
ments in Dividends?” American Economic
Review, June 1981, 71(3), pp. 421–36.
. Irrational exuberance. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000.
11 VOL. 91 NO. 2 RICHARD T. ELY LECTURE